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Low probability catastrophic climate change can have a signi¯cant
in°uence on policy under hyperbolic discounting. We compare the
set of Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) to the optimal policy under
time-consistent commitment. For some initial levels of risk there
are multiple MPE; these may involve either excessive or insu±cient
stabilization e®ort. These results imply that even if the free-rider
problem amongst contemporaneous decision-makers were solved, there
may remain a coordination problem amongst successive generations
of decision-makers. A numerical example shows that under plausible
conditions society should respond vigorously to the threat of climate
change.
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Low probability events { those with low hazard rates { are unlikely to occur
until the distant future. A constant (non-negligible) discount rate makes
this kind of event appear insigni¯cant, even if it causes substantial and long-
lasting future damage. We study the set of Markov perfect equilibria (MPE)
to a model with catastrophic events and hyperbolic discounting. This model
provides a new way to analyze policy where low probability irreversible events
are important, as with climate change. The analysis increases the scope of
application of hyperbolic discounting, and it illuminates the relation between
hyperbolic discounting and intertemporal coordination games.
We use the model to study climate change policy. An example helps to
illustrate the problem. Suppose that an \event" reduces in perpetuity the
annual °ow of utility by 1 util, and the constant annual hazard rate is h. A
policy eliminates the risk at a °ow cost (caused by abatement e®orts or a
perpetual reduction of economic activity) of x and the constant annual pure
rate of time preference is r. The largest °ow cost that society would accept
in order to eliminate the hazard is x¤ = h
h+r. This example shows that if
the hazard rate is small relative to the discount rate { the likely case when
the event is low probability and we use a constant discount rate { society is
not willing to spend much to eliminate the risk.1
Climate change modelers have used both constant and hyperbolic dis-
counting. The near-zero pure rate of time preference that Stern (2006)
uses is not consistent with the empirical evidence that individuals have non-
negligible discount rates (Frederick et al. 2002), and the fact of positive real
1The expected present value of the value-at-risk is 1
h+r and the present value under
the policy is 1¡x
r . Equating these values and solving for x gives the largest °ow cost that
society would accept in order to eliminate the hazard. If the annual discount rate is 5%
and the probability of the event occurring within a century is 5% then x¤ = 0:01015. In
the case of climate change, where inertia is important, current actions could alter future
but not current risk. By assuming that the policy has an immediate e®ect on the hazard,
this example overstates the amount that society would be willing to spend.
1interest rates. A near-zero discount rate also implies that current generations
should make implausible sacri¯ces for the future (Nordhaus 2006). Models
that use constant rates similar to current medium run real interest rates as-
sume that these accurately re°ect our long run discount rate, and essentially
ignore the future beyond a century or so. A compromise, using a smaller
constant discount rate, is vulnerable to the criticism that externalities should
be modeled explicitly rather than by reducing the discount rate.
Nordhaus (1999) and Mastrandrea and Schneider (2001) use a declining
pure rate of time preference, thereby respecting the evidence concerning short
run rates and the ethical imperative to put non-negligible weight on future
welfare. The declining pure rate of time preference is reasonable: We may
feel closer to our children than to our unborn grandchildren, but it is less
likely that we make a distinction between the 10th and the 11th future gen-
eration. However, these papers assume that the current policy-maker can
make commitments about future actions. Since the policy horizon extends
for centuries, this is a strong assumption. In addition, the full commitment
outcome under hyperbolic discounting (typically) exhibits procrastination,
which might be confounded with the sensible proposal to defer action until
technological improvements make it cheaper.2; 3
Climate scientists have identi¯ed several low probability catastrophic con-
sequences of climate change, including a sudden rise in sea level, a mass ex-
tinction of species, or a weakening of the Thermohaline Circuit (the THC,
which moderates European climate) (Chichilnisky and Heal 1993, IPCC 2001,
Alley et al. 2003, Thomas et al. 2004, Milennium Ecosystem Assessment
2005). Two recent studies estimate a 30% chance of the collapse or sig-
2Cropper and Laibson (1999) discuss hyperbolic discounting in the climate change
context. Karp (2005) uses quasi-hyperbolic discounting in a deterministic setting under
the assumption that regulators use Markov Perfect policies.
3A large literature addresses the valuation of future welfare, motivated by con-
siderations of inter-generational equity and sustainability (Solow 1974, Hartwick 1977,
Chichilnisky 1996, Arrow 1999, Asheim and Buchholz 2004) and uncertainty (Weitzman
2001, Gollier 2002, Dasgupta and Maskin 2005).
2ni¯cant weakening of the THC within the next century under Business as
Usual (BAU) (Challenor et al. 2006, Schlesinger et al. 2006).4 Some climate
scientists think that the risk is negligible (Wunsch 2006).
Models of dynamic management under event uncertainty (Cropper 1976,
Clarke and Reed 1994, Tsur and Zemel 1996, 1998) provide our starting point.
We extend these models by replacing constant discounting with hyperbolic
discounting, using methods from Karp (2007).5 Our stationary model (where
the pure rate of time preference equals the social discount rate) incorporates
risk and hyperbolic discounting using realistic behavioral assumptions.
The next section describes our general model and a binary action spe-
cialization, in which the regulator chooses either to stabilize the hazard or to
follow BAU. Section 3 provides a benchmark, in which the current regulator
can make a commitment to all future policies. Section 4, which contains
our theoretical contribution, studies the set of MPE, where regulators can-
not commit to future actions. We provide the necessary conditions for a
MPE in a general setting, and then obtain a closed form characterization
in the binary action setting. The model under hyperbolic discounting, like
some dynamic coordination games, has multiple subgame perfect equilibria
because the optimal policy today depends on beliefs about the policies that
will be chosen by future regulators. A MPE may result in either too much
or too little stabilization, relative to our benchmark. Section 5 studies the
optimization problem under constant discounting, in order to highlight the
e®ect of hyperbolic discounting. Section 6 shows numerically the importance
of risk, commitment, and discounting.
4There has been substantial work in assessing the likely economic costs of gradual
climate change (Chakravorty et al. 1997, Mendelsohn 2003, Schlenker et al. 2006).
5Harris and Laibson (2004) study a model in which a random event (a jump process)
leads to the replacement of the current regulator by her successor, thus providing a di®erent
motivation for hyperbolic discounting.
32 The model
We use a stationary model, in which the business-as-usual (BAU) °ow of per
capita consumption before the catastrophic event occurs is a constant c+¢.
After the event occurs, the constant °ow of consumption is c, so ¢ > 0 is
the income-at-risk, expressed as a perpetual loss in the °ow of consumption
due to the event occurrence. Society can take an action w(t) to reduce the
probability of the event, e.g. by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. This
action requires abatement expenditures and therefore reduces instantaneous
utility; the control w = 0 corresponds to BAU (\no action"). Once the
disaster has occurred it is too late to act, so w = 0 is optimal during the post-
event period. The °ow of utility prior to the catastrophe is u(c + ¢;w(t))
and utility after the catastrophe is u(c;0).
The discount factor is
µ(t) = ¯e
¡°t + (1 ¡ ¯)e
¡±t (1)





¯°e¡°t + ±e¡±t(1 ¡ ¯)
¯e¡°t + e¡±t(1 ¡ ¯)
: (2)
Equation (2) implies that
dr(t)
d¯ < 0: an increase in ¯ lowers the discount rate,
i.e. increases the concern for the future. For ¯ = 0 the constant discount
rate is ± and with ¯ = 1 the constant discount rate is °.
Let T represent the random time when the event occurs, with the prob-
ability distribution and density functions F(t) and f(t), respectively. The
hazard rate is de¯ned as h(t) = f(t)=(1¡F(t)) = ¡d[ln(1¡F(t))]=dt, yield-
ing
F(t) = 1 ¡ e







4Conditional on the disaster not having yet occurred, y(0) = 0. Thus,
_ y(t) = h(t); y(0) = 0: (5)
The present value associated with catastrophe at T and a policy w(t) is
R T








0 µ(t)U (w(t);c;¢)dt + constant;
(6)
where U (w(t);c;¢) ´ u(c + ¢;w(t)) ¡ u(c;0). We refer to U (0;c;¢)
as the \value-at-risk"{ the change in the °ow of utility due to the event
occurrence if society takes no action to stabilize the risk (w = 0). Due to
our stationarity assumption, the parameters ¢ and c are constants and will
be suppressed when convenient. We also ignore the constant term in the
payo®,
R 1
0 µ(t)u(c;0)dt, since it is independent of the control w(t) and the
time of catastrophe T. At time t = 0, the expected present value of the











The hazard rate is an increasing function of the stock of greenhouse gasses
(GHGs). Current consumption and abatement decisions (the control, w)
a®ect the evolution of this stock, thus a®ecting the evolution of the hazard.
In view of the (assumed) one-to-one relation between the hazard rate and
the stock of GHGs, there is no loss of generality in treating the hazard rate
rather than the GHG stock as the state variable. The control variable prior
to the catastrophe, w(t), a®ects the °ow of utility at time time t, U(w(t)),
as well as the evolution of the hazard rate:
_ h = g(h;w); h(0) = h0 (given). (8)
(We suppress the time argument when there is no confusion.) The optimal
policy w(t) maximizes (7) subject to (5) and (8).
52.1 A binary action specialization
We emphasize a binary action specialization of the above general model:
society can either stabilize the stock of greenhouse gasses at the current
level, thus stabilizing the hazard, or follow BAU and allow the hazard to
increase (with the stock of GHGs). The stabilization policy (correspond-
ing to w(t) = 1) costs society the fraction X of the income-at-risk ¢, so
the °ow of consumption under stabilization (before the catastrophe occurs)
is c + ¢(1 ¡ X). Under BAU (corresponding to w(t) = 0), the °ow of
consumption is c + ¢. The °ow payo®s in this binary-action model are
U(1) = u(c + ¢(1 ¡ X)) ¡ u(c) and U(0) = u(c + ¢) ¡ u(c): (9)
We let x ´ 1 ¡
U(1)
U(0) represent the fractional reduction in the value-at-risk
under stabilization (prior to the catastrophe). Hereafter we refer to x as
simply the \cost of stabilization". This parameter summarizes all of the
pertinent information regarding the utility function and the parameters ¢
and X: In the case where u(¢) is linear, X = x. For example, with linear
utility, if the event reduces the °ow of income by $100 billion annually, the
value x = 0:15 means that stabilization costs $15 billion per year.
We assume that under BAU the hazard rate approaches the steady state
level a at a constant rate ½:
_ h(t) = ½(a ¡ h(t)): (10)
If the initial hazard rate (at time 0) is h0 and society follows BAU until time
t, the hazard rate at time t is
h(t) = a ¡ (a ¡ h0)e
¡½t: (11)
We also assume that the hazard (not just the event) is irreversible. If
society follows BAU until time t and then switches (forever) to stabilization,
the hazard rate remains constant at the level h(t). Provided that h0 < a
(as we assume), the hazard never falls under BAU. The three parameters
6of the hazard function, h0, a and ½ provide measures of the current risk, the
eventual risk under BAU, and the speed of adjustment of the risk.
For all of the equilibria that we study, a larger value of h makes it \less
likely" that the decision-maker chooses to stabilize. As the hazard ap-
proaches the steady state level a, its growth rate approaches 0.6 There is
little bene¯t from stabilization when the hazard is close to its steady state,
so stabilization does not occur unless the cost is low (x is small). Obviously
there is no bene¯t from incurring stabilization costs if h = a, since in this
case the hazard rate does not increase under BAU.
3 Restricted commitment: a benchmark
This section analyzes the binary action model under restricted commitment.
Here the current (t = 0) regulator decides whether to adopt stabilization or
BAU in perpetuity. This policy menu is \restricted", because the current
regulator commits to one of two policies in perpetuity. \Unrestricted" com-
mitment, in contrast, allows the current regulator to announce a trajectory
in which the policy switches at a speci¯ed time in the future (conditional on
the event not having occurred). For example, under unrestricted commit-
ment the current regulator is able to delay stabilization until a positive but
¯nite future time. Whenever the optimal time to switch from BAU to stabi-
lization is positive and ¯nite, non-exponential discounting causes the policy
announced at time 0 to be time-inconsistent. A future regulator would want
to deviate from the policy announced by the current regulator, by delay-
ing the switching time (i.e., by procrastinating). Hereafter we consider only
restricted commitment.
Under BAU, noting (11), the probability of disaster by time t is
F
BAU(t) = 1 ¡ exp
µ




6Di®erent growth functions for the hazard are discussed in a separate note, available
upon request.





















Under perpetual stabilization, the probability of disaster by time t is 1 ¡ e¡h0t













(1 ¡ ¯)° + h + ¯±
(± + h)(h + °)
: (16)
The regulator chooses to stabilize if and only if V S ¸ V B. This inequality
is equivalent to
U(1)





(We assume that a tie results in stabilization.) Noting that
U(1)
U(0) = 1 ¡ x,
the condition V S ¸ V B holds if and only if x · ¹ xC(h0), where
¹ x
C(h) ´ 1 ¡ ¸(h): (18)
The superscript on ¹ xC is a mnemonic for \commitment", and the over-bar
indicates that this variable is an upper bound.
The following Proposition describes the optimal policy under restricted
commitment. (All proofs are in the appendix.)
Proposition 1. (i) The functions º(h) and »(h) are positive, decreasing
and convex for h ¸ 0. (ii) º (a) = » (a) and º (h) < » (h) for 0 · h < a and
½ > 0. (iii) The optimal policy under restricted commitment is to stabilize if
8and only if x · ¹ xc(h). (iv) The optimal policy under restricted commitment
is time consistent for all initial hazard values 0 · h · a and 0 < x < 1 if
and only if ¸
0(h) ¸ 0. (v) ½ ¸ a + ± is su±cient for ¸
0(h) ¸ 0.
Part (i) implies that the shadow value of h is negative and decreasing
(in absolute value) under either policy. Part (ii) implies that ¸(h) · 1
and ¸(a) = 1. Since U(1) < U(0), the regulator does not want to stabilize
for h su±ciently close to the steady state value, a. Part (iii) is simply
a restatement of the earlier derivation, and part (iv) provides a condition
under which the policy is time consistent. When this condition is satis¯ed,
a larger value of h decreases the range of x for which the policy-maker wants
to stabilize. Here, stabilization is \more likely" at lower values of h, as noted
in Section 2.1.
In exploring numerical examples, we found no parameter values that vi-
olate the necessary and su±cient condition ¸
0(h) ¸ 0, suggesting that time
consistency is \typical" for this model. As noted above, the optimal plan
under unrestricted commitment is, in general, time inconsistent. By reduc-
ing the set of possible plans that a regulator can announce, we also reduce
the temptation for subsequent regulators to deviate from the plan announced
by the initial regulator.
Since we are interested in a situation that unfolds over many decades or
centuries, it is not reasonable for the current regulator to act as if she can
commit future generations to follow the plan that she announces. The prob-
lem with restricted commitment as an equilibrium concept (in our setting)
is not that it requires commitments that subsequent generations would want
to break. When policies are time consistent, future generations are happy to
abide by the choice made by a previous generation, provided that they can
make the same choice for their successors. Instead, restricted commitment is
an unsatisfactory equilibrium concept because it is based on an assumption
that is patently false, namely that the current generation can commit future
generations to a speci¯c course of action. (Another view is that restricted
9commitment is an unsatisfactory equilibrium concept because the restriction
is ad hoc.)
4 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
This section studies the Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE), where a regulator
at a point in time is unable to commit to future actions. The current
regulator chooses the optimal current action, recognizing that future actions
depend on the payo®-relevant state variable.
We explained above why restricted commitment, despite its time-consistency,
is an unsatisfactory equilibrium concept. In a MPE trajectory, the current
regulator cannot commit future generations to a speci¯c course of action but
she can in°uence the successors' actions by a®ecting the world they inherit,
i.e. by changing the payo®-relevant state variable. The MPE recognizes the
di®erence between in°uencing future policies and choosing those policies. In
a MPE agents condition their actions on (only) the payo®-relevant state vari-
able, and they understand that their successors do likewise. Therefore, an
agent's beliefs about future policies depend on her beliefs about the future
trajectory of the state variable. An agent's action has an immediate e®ect
on her current °ow payo® and it also a®ects the continuation value via its
in°uence on the state variable.
We use results from Karp (2007), who obtains the necessary conditions
for a MPE under hyperbolic discounting by taking the limit of a discrete
time sequential game amongst a succession of regulators. Regulators are
indexed by the time at which they move, t = i", i = 0;1;2;3::: . Regulator
i's decision lasts for " units of time. Regulator i chooses the current pol-
icy and understands that future policies depend on the payo®-relevant state
variable. She takes the current hazard rate as given and recognizes that
her action a®ects the evolution of the hazard, thereby a®ecting the actions
of her successors. Each regulator in the in¯nite sequence of regulators cares
10about current and future welfare (discounted using the hyperbolic discount
function µ(t)) but not about her predecessors' welfare: bygones are bygones.
Regulators use stationary, Markov policies. Beginning with the equilibrium
condition to this discrete stage game and formally letting " ! 0, produces
the equilibrium condition for the continuous time game, in which each regu-
lator is active for an in¯nitesimal length of time. We begin with the general
model of Section 2 and then specialize to the binary action model of Section
2.1.
4.1 The general model
The state variable is the vector z ´ (h;y). A policy function maps the state
z into the control w. An equilibrium policy function ^ Â(z) satis¯es the Nash
property: w(t) = ^ Â(z(t)) is the optimal policy for the regulator at time t
given the state z(t) and given the belief that regulators at ¿ > t will choose
their actions according to w(¿) = ^ Â(z(¿)). The state variable h is standard:
at a future time t > 0, the value of h(t) depends on h(0) and intervening de-
cisions w(¿), 0 · ¿ < t. The probability of survival until time t also depends
on h(0) and intervening decisions. However, conditional on survival at time
t, y(t) = 0. If the regulator at time t is in a position to make a decision, the
event has not yet occurred. This fact means that a stationary equilibrium
depends only on the current hazard, h(t). Conditional on survival at time
t, h(t) is the only payo®-relevant state variable.
Throughout this paper we restrict attention to stationary pure strategies.
The following Proposition gives the necessary condition for a MPE:
Proposition 2. Consider the game in which the payo® at time t equals ex-
pression (7); the regulator at time t chooses w(t) 2 ­ ½ R, taking as given
her successors' control rule ^ Â(z); and the state variables y and h obey equa-
tions (5) and (8). Let V (h) equal the value of expression (7) in a MPE (the
value function). A MPE control rule Â(h) ´ ^ Â(z) satis¯es the (generalized)
11dynamic programming equation (DPE):




with the \side condition"





Remark 1. The control rule that maximizes the right-hand side of equation
(19) depends on the payo® relevant state h, but not on y. This control rule
also depends on the current regulator's beliefs about her successors' policies.
Those policies a®ect the hazard shadow value V 0(h).
Remark 2. The DPE is \generalized" in the sense that it collapses to the
standard model with constant discounting in the two limiting cases ¯ = 1 and
¯ = 0. The former case is obvious from equation (20). To demonstrate the
latter case, note that for ¯ = 0, K(h) = (± ¡ °)
R 1
0 e¡(±s+y(s))U(Â(hs))ds =
(± ¡ °)V (h). Substituting this equation into (19) produces the DPE corre-
sponding to the constant discount rate ±.
4.2 The MPE for the binary action model
We now specialize to the binary model, where the control space is ­ = f0;1g.
The payo® U(w) is given by equation (9), and the equation of motion for
the hazard is _ h = ½(a ¡ h)(1 ¡ w). Under stabilization (w = 1) the °ow of
consumption is c + ¢(1 ¡ X) and the hazard remains constant; under BAU
(w = 0) the °ow of consumption is c + ¢ and the hazard changes according
to equation (10). Let Â(h) be a MPE decision rule. Using the equilibrium
condition (19) and the convention that in the event of a tie the regulator
chooses stabilization, in the binary setting Â satis¯es
Â(h) =
(
1 if U(1) ¸ U(0) + ½(a ¡ h)V 0(h)
0 if U(1) < U(0) + ½(a ¡ h)V 0(h)
: (21)
12A particular control rule corresponds to a division of the state space [0;a]
into a \stabilization region" (where Â(h) = 1) and a \BAU region"(where
Â(h) = 0).
For perpetual stabilization to be a MPE, it must be in the interest of the
current regulator to stabilize when she believes that all future regulators will
stabilize. With this belief, V (h) = V S(h) and V 0(h) = V S0(h) = U(1)»
0(h),















Thus, using the equilibrium rule (21), U(1) ¸ U(0)+½(a¡h)U(1)»
0(h) must
hold for stabilization to be a MPE. De¯ning
¼(h) ´
1
1 ¡ ½(a ¡ h)»
0(h)
; (23)
the condition under which perpetual stabilization is a MPE can be stated as
U(1)
U(0) ¸ ¼(h).
Similarly, for perpetual BAU to be a MPE, it must be the case that
U(1) < U(0) + ½(a ¡ h)V B0(h) = U(0) + ½(a ¡ h)U(0)º0(h). De¯ning
¾(h) ´ 1 + ½(a ¡ h)º
0(h); (24)


















We summarize properties of ¼(h) and ¾(h) in
Lemma 1. The functions ¼ (h) and ¾ (h) are increasing over (0;a) with
¼ (a) = ¾ (a) = 1, and ¾ (h) is concave.
13The following proposition provides a condition for existence of MPE and
characterizes the class of MPE in which regulators never switch from one
type of policy to another:
Proposition 3. There exists a pure strategy stationary MPE for all 0 < x < 1
and all initial conditions h = h0 2 (0;a) if and only if
¼ (h) < ¾ (h); h 2 (0;a): (26)
Under equation (26), there exists a MPE with perpetual stabilization (w ´ 1)
if and only if the initial condition h0 = h satis¯es
x < ¹ x
S (h) ´ 1 ¡ ¼ (h); (27)
there exists a MPE with perpetual BAU (w ´ 0) if and only if the initial
condition h0 = h satis¯es
x > x
B (h) ´ 1 ¡ ¾(h): (28)
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 3. The ¯gure shows 1¡¾(h) and 1¡¼(h)
with ¼(h) < ¾(h) for h 2 (0;a). The curves divide the rectangle 0 · h ·
a;0 · x · 1 into three regions. For points above the curve 1 ¡ ¾ (h)
there is a MPE trajectory with perpetual BAU, and for points beneath the
curve 1 ¡ ¼ (h) there is a MPE trajectory with perpetual stabilization. For
points between the curves, both perpetual stabilization and perpetual BAU
are equilibria.
Because the region between these two curves has positive measure, the
existence of multiple equilibria is generic in this model. This situation
provides a simple example of the existence of multiple MPE under hyperbolic
discounting { a possibility previously noted by Krusell and Smith (2003) and
Karp (2005, 2007). The multiplicity of equilibria stems from the fact that the
optimal action today depends on the shadow value V 0(h), which depends on










Figure 1: There is a MPE with perpetual stabilization for parameters below
the graph of 1 ¡ ¼. There is a MPE with perpetual BAU for parameters
above the graph of 1 ¡¾. Both types of MPE exist for parameters between
the graphs.
will stabilize, the shadow cost of the state (¡V 0(h)) is high, relative to the
shadow cost when future regulators follow BAU. The current regulator has
more incentive to stabilize if she believes that future regulators will also
stabilize: actions are \strategic complements". The next two sections show
that inter-generational coordination problems can lead to either too little or
too much stabilization, relative to the level under restricted commitment.
When the current regulator cannot commit to future policies, and each
regulator in the in¯nite sequence of regulators follows Markov Perfect poli-
cies and has hyperbolic discounting, the equilibrium problem resembles the
dynamic coordination game familiar from the \history versus expectations"
literature (Matsuyama 1991, Krugman 1991). In those coordination games,
the optimal decision for (non-atomic) agents in the current period depends
on actions that will be taken by agents in the future; there are typically
multiple rational expectations equilibria for a set of initial conditions of the
15state variable, and these equilibria are in general not Pareto e±cient.
Proposition 3 characterizes only equilibrium trajectories in which the ac-
tion never changes. It is clear that a switch from stabilization to BAU is
impossible, since the hazard remains constant under stabilization and the
decisionmaker uses a pure strategy. However, the proposition does not rule
out the possibility of a MPE with delayed stabilization, i.e. an equilibrium
beginning with BAU and switching to stabilization once the hazard reaches
a threshold. The next proposition shows that such equilibria exist.7 We
















Proposition 4. Suppose that Condition (26) is satis¯ed. (i) For x > 1 ¡ ¼(h)
the unique (pure strategy) MPE is perpetual BAU. (ii) There are no equilib-
ria with \delayed BAU". (iii) A necessary and su±cient condition for the
existence of equilibria with delayed stabilization is
£(h) < x < 1 ¡ ¼(h): (30)
(iv) For all parameters satisfying 0 · h · a, 0 < ¯ < 1, ± 6= °, and ½ > 0, a
MPE with delayed stabilization exists for some x 2 (0;1).
Recall that x, the \cost of stabilization", equals the utility cost of stabi-
lizing the hazard (or the atmospheric GHG concentration) as a fraction of
the value-at-risk U(0) = u(c + ¢) ¡ u(c). Relation (30) de¯nes the lower
and upper bounds of x for a delayed stabilization MPE to exist. We verify
in the appendix that
1 ¡ ¼(h) ¡ £(h) =
(± ¡ °)2(2h + ° + ±)
(h + °)2(h + ±)2 ¯(1 ¡ ¯): (31)
7From the proof of the proposition it is evident that for initial conditions such that
delayed stabilization equilibria exist, there are a continuum of such equilibria, indexed by
the threshold at which the decisionmaker begins to stabilize.
16Thus, these bounds form a non-empty interval when 0 < ¯ < 1 and ° 6= ±,
i.e., when the discount rate is non-constant.
5 Constant discounting
Even with constant discounting, the binary action model is not entirely stan-
dard. Understanding this model is useful for interpreting numerical results
in the next section, and more generally for understanding the MPE when ¯
is near one of its boundaries.
Since our empirical application involves a small value of ¯, we consider
the case where ¯ = 0. (Analysis of the case ¯ = 1 requires only replacing
± with °.) The constant discount rate is ±, so the distant future is \heav-
ily discounted". Following the standard procedure to obtain the DPE, or
invoking Remark 2, we have the following DPE:
(± + h)V (h) = max
w2f0;1g
fU(w) + ½(a ¡ h)(1 ¡ w)V
0(h)g: (32)
Let ¼0 (h) and ¾0 (h) denote the functions ¼ (h) and ¾ (h) (de¯ned in
equations (23) and (24)) evaluated at ¯ = 0. The following proposition
describes the optimal solution to the control problem with ¯ = 0.
Proposition 5. Under constant discounting (with ¯ = 0), it is optimal to
stabilize in perpetuity when x · 1¡¾0 (h) and it is optimal to follow BAU in
perpetuity when x > 1¡¾0 (h). The function ¾0 (h) determines the boundary
between the BAU and stabilization regions and ¼0 (h) is irrelevant.
The proposition has two implications. First, note that ¼ (h) and ¾ (h)
are continuous in ¯, so ¼0 (h) and ¾0 (h) are the limits of these functions as
¯ ! 0. Consider a value of ¯ that is positive but close to 0 and values
of h and x that satisfy 1 ¡ ¼ (h) > x > 1 ¡ ¾ (h). (Such values exist be-
cause ¼ (h) and ¾ (h) are continuous in ¯, and there exists h;x that satisfy
1 ¡ ¼0 (h) > x > 1 ¡ ¾0 (h), as shown in the proof of Proposition 5.) For
17this combination of parameters and state variable, there are two MPE, in-
volving either perpetual stabilization or perpetual BAU (by Proposition 3),
but the payo® under perpetual BAU is higher than under stabilization (by
continuity and Proposition 5). That is, there are MPE that involve excessive
stabilization relative to the benchmark under restricted commitment.
It is not, however, true in general that when 1 ¡ ¼ (h) > x > 1 ¡ ¾ (h),
BAU yields a higher payo® than stabilization. The argument used in the
proof of Proposition 5 shows that where there are two solutions to the DPE,
the solution associated with BAU gives a higher payo®. Inspection of the
proof shows that this argument does not carry over to the case where ¯ is
bounded away from 0, because in this situation the DPE under hyperbolic
discounting is not close to the DPE under constant discounting.
The second implication is that ¸(h) = ¾(h) under constant discounting.
That is, the optimal solution when the regulator is restricted to making a
commitment (in perpetuity) at time 0, is equal to the solution when the reg-
ulator has the opportunity to switch between BAU and stabilization. For
abrupt events, the regulator is tempted to delay stabilization (i.e. the \re-
striction" in restricted commitment binds) only under hyperbolic discount-
ing. The ability to switch between policies is of no value for abrupt events
under constant discounting. The economic explanation for this result is
simply that BAU is the optimal policy only if the hazard is su±ciently large;
under BAU the hazard increases, whereas it remains constant under stabi-
lization.
6 Numerical illustration
We illustrate the binary action model of Section 2.1 using two climate sce-
narios that di®er with regard to the initial hazard. Under the \pessimistic"
initial hazard the probability of the catastrophe occurring within a century
is 5% under stabilization (the policy that keeps the hazard constant) and the
18probability under BAU is 18%. Under the \optimistic" initial hazard the
probability of occurrence is 0.5% under stabilization, and 15.3% under BAU.
For both scenarios the maximal hazard a implies a 50% occurrence proba-
bility within a century. We choose ½ so that under BAU it takes 100 years
to travel half way between the \pessimistic" initial hazard h0 and a. Table
1 presents the resulting hazard parameter values for these two scenarios.





Table 2 lists values of the hyperbolic discounting parameters, ¯, ± and
°. We use three long run discount rates, ° = 0:0005; ° = 0:00005 and
° = 0 (corresponding to long run discount rates of 0:05%, 0:005% and 0%,
respectively). We choose the parameters ¯;± so that the short run discount
rate is 5% (r(0) = 0:05) and the discount rate a century in the future is 4%
(r(100) = 0:04) for each of the three long run rates.
Table 2: Discounting parameter values.
° 5 £ 10¡4 5 £ 10¡5 0
¯ 0:00178999 0.00169212 0.00168159
± 0:0500888 0.0500847 0.0500842
Figure 2 shows the graphs of the discount rates and discount factors
corresponding to a constant discount rate of 5% and to the hyperbolic rate
in Table 2 with ° = 0:0005. Under hyperbolic discounting, the discount
rate is greater than 4% during the ¯rst century. Despite the similarity of
19the discount factors under constant and hyperbolic discounting during this
period, the policy implications di®er markedly: The future lasts a long time.
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Figure 2: Discount rates and factors: dotted curve = hyperbolic discount
rate; solid curve = discount factor under hyperbolic discounting; dashed
curve = discount factor under constant 0.05 discount rate.
The parameter values in Tables 1 and 2 do not satisfy the su±cient con-
dition in part iv of Proposition 1. Nevertheless, as Figure 3 reveals, ¸(h) is
strictly increasing (and it remains so for all climate and discounting scenarios
considered here). By Proposition 1, the policy under restricted commitment
is time consistent. Figure 3 also shows that ¾(h) > ¼(h), so the necessary
and su±cient condition for existence of the MPE (cf. Proposition 3) is sat-
is¯ed. The fact that the graphs of ¸ and ¼ intersect implies that in some
MPE there is excessive stabilization, relative to the restricted commitment
benchmark.
Equations (18), (27), and (28) de¯ne the three critical values of x: ¹ xc =













Figure 3: The graphs of ¸(h); ¾(h) and ¼(h).
is willing to incur in order to stabilize; ¹ xS = 1¡¼ is the maximum cost that
is consistent with stabilization in a MPE; xB = 1 ¡ ¾ is the minimum cost
that is consistent with BAU in a MPE. Table 3 shows these thresholds under
the di®erent discounting and hazard scenarios.
Consider for example the pessimistic initial hazard and the long run dis-
count rate ° = 0:00005. In this scenario, stabilization is the only MPE if
stabilization costs less than 1.34% of the value-at-risk. If stabilization costs
between 1.34% and 16.69% of the value-at-risk both stabilization and BAU
are MPE. If stabilization costs more than 16.69% of the value-at-risk, BAU
is the only MPE. If the present generation can commit to actions taken by
future generations, stabilization is the optimal policy only if it costs no more
than 12.37% of the value-at-risk.
Table 3 shows that it is possible to have a MPE with stabilization even
though the socially optimal policy under restricted commitment requires
BAU. When that occurs, the MPE leads to excessive stabilization e®ort.
This possibility requires ¹ xS(h) > x > ¹ xC(h), which can happen when ¸(h) > ¼(h)
(see Figure 3). It is also possible that ¹ xS(h) < ¹ xC(h), which happens when
21Table 3: Policy bounds.
Discounting mode xB ¹ xS ¹ xC
Optimistic
Hyperbolic ° = 0:0005 0.0143888 0.166323 0.122572
Hyperbolic ° = 0:00005 0.0144876 0.736511 0.355016
Hyperbolic ° = 0 0.0144996 0.861326 0.451631
Constant 4% 0.0193835 0.0193835
Pessimistic
Hyperbolic ° = 0:0005 0.0132928 0.0694618 0.0737647
Hyperbolic ° = 0:00005 0.0133795 0.166933 0.123743
Hyperbolic ° = 0 0.01339 0.191701 0.13406
Constant 4% 0.0179322 0.0179322
¸(h) < ¼ (h). In this case if xS(h) < x < ¹ xC(h), stabilization is the optimal
(restricted commitment) policy, but all MPE lead to BAU. In all of our
experiments, xB < ¹ xC (i.e., ¸ < ¾) so there always exist parameter values
(xB < x < ¹ xC) for which there is a MPE leading to BAU, even though the
optimal policy requires stabilization. In this respect, there can always be
insu±cient stabilization in a MPE.
Comparison of the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios (low and high h0,
respectively) illustrates that a low initial value of h encourages stabilization:
it expands the range of x for which stabilization is an (or the only) equilib-
rium. We discussed the reason for this result in Section 2.1. The growth
rate of the hazard is a decreasing function of the hazard. Since stabilization
keeps the risk from growing, it is more attractive to incur costs to stabilize
when the growth rate is large, i.e. when h is small.
The upper bounds, ¹ xS and ¹ xC, are quite sensitive to changes in the long
run discount rate °. The lower bound, xB , is relatively insensitive to these
changes. The set of utility-related parameter values for which the MPE is
indeterminate (i.e., where xB < x < ¹ xS) varies from about 5.5% to 85% of
22the feasible range (0;1). It is clear from these examples that indeterminacy
of the MPE is not a knife-edge phenomenon.
The two rows in Table 3 labelled \constant 4%" show the critical threshold
of x under a constant discount rate of 4%, in the optimistic and pessimistic
scenarios. As we explained below Proposition 5, this bound equals xB = ¹ xc:
(Since ¹ xS is irrelevant, it is not reported.) For example, in the optimistic
scenario, society is willing to sacri¯ce 1.9% of the value-at-risk in order to
stabilize the risk, when the discount rate is constant at 4%. With a hyper-
bolic discount rate that begins at 5%, is greater than 4% for a century, and
asymptotically approaches .05%, society is willing (under restricted commit-
ment) to sacri¯ce over 12% of the value-at-risk in order to stabilize the risk.
Thus, even though the short run discount rate is higher under hyperbolic
discounting in this example, the fact that the long run discount rate is much
smaller, increases society's willingness to pay for stabilization by a factor of
more than six.
Table 4 reports \constant-equivalent" discount rates. These rates lead
to the same decision rules (the same threshold levels of x) as in the Markov
Perfect and restricted commitment equilibria with hyperbolic discounting
and ° = :0005. For example, a constant discount rate of 0.0126 (1.26%)
leads to the same threshold as under limited commitment with hyperbolic
discounting in the optimistic scenario. The constant-equivalent discount
rates corresponding to the MPE with the least likelihood of stabilization are
about 4.7%, close to the short run discount rate under hyperbolic discounting.
In contrast, the constant-equivalent discount rates corresponding to the MPE
with the greatest likelihood of stabilization lie between 1% and 1.8%.
A standard public ¯nance position is that an externality (or some other
market failure) that justi¯es undertaking a project should be incorporated
directly into the cost-bene¯t analysis, rather than captured by an adjustment
in the discount rate. In our view, the discount rate in a 30 year bond
(or some other short-lived ¯nancial instrument) tells us very little about
23Table 4: \Constant equivalent" discount rates corresponding to hyperbolic
discounting with ° = 0:0005.
xB ¹ xS ¹ xC
Optimistic 0.0471568 0.009964 0.012628
Pessimistic 0.0472403 0.0176443 0.016947
the \correct" long run social discount rate, and it certainly does not tell
us that the discount rate should be constant. We think that hyperbolic
discounting models provide a better representation of society's view of far-
distant generations, but these models are di±cult to work with. Therefore,
it is worth having a sense of how constant discount rates should be adjusted
to mimic a hyperbolic discounting model. Table 4 provides some evidence
on this point.











Figure 4: The graphs of 1 ¡ ¼(h), £(h) and 1 ¡ ¾(h) when ° = 5 £ 10¡4.
Figure 4 shows the graphs of 1¡¼(h), £(h) and 1¡¾(h) under hyperbolic
discounting with ° = 5 £ 10¡4. For any given initial hazard h, a delayed
24stabilization MPE exists when x falls between £(h) and 1¡¼(h) (Proposition
4). The ¯gure shows that the delayed stabilization region (£(h);1 ¡ ¼(h))
is a strict subset of (1 ¡ ¾(h);1 ¡ ¼(h)), which is the region where both
perpetual BAU and perpetual stabilization are MPE (Proposition 3). Since
the two sets are nearly the same, in \most" cases were multiple \single action
MPE" exist, there also exist \delayed stabilization MPE". The existence of
a MPE with perpetual stabilization is a necessary condition for existence of
a MPE with delayed stabilization.
7 Conclusion
Most integrated assessment models that are used to evaluate climate pol-
icy either do not consider catastrophic events or introduce them in an ad
hoc manner. The damage due to climate change is typically assumed to
be gradual, allowing for adjustment and adaptation. There appears to be a
widespread view amongst environmental economists that taking into account
(more systematically) the risk of catastrophic climate-related events would
not fundamentally alter the recommendations implied by mainstream mod-
els. There are two main reasons for this view: (i) the event is unlikely, so the
probability of it happening in the near future is too small to worry about; (ii)
the inertia in the climate system means that current policy changes would
a®ect the risk only in the distant future. These arguments are persuasive
only if the long-run discount rate remains substantial. In view of our in-
ability to distinguish between generations in the distant future, we think
that a model with a declining discount rate provides a better description of
how most people regard the distant future, and therefore provides a better
normative guide for climate policy.
We studied a model in which changes in the pro¯le of GHG emissions
a®ect the future risk of abrupt climate events. To account for the inertia in
the climate system, di®erent policies lead to gradually diverging risks, with
25¯nite steady state di®erences. In this setting, a normative model with con-
stant discounting (at a \plausible" rate) might conclude that stabilization is
too expensive. Such a conclusion re°ects the judgement that the current
generation should be indi®erent to the welfare of generations in the distant
future. This judgement should not be mistaken for a scienti¯c conclusion.
Market rates for ¯nancial instruments that mature in 30 years tell us little
about our willingness to transfer consumption between two very distant gen-
erations. Hyperbolic discounting forces us to make an explicit judgement
about trade-o®s in the long run, while still respecting the empirical evidence
about short and medium run discount rates.
We obtained the necessary condition for Markov Perfect Equilibria in a
general setting with hyperbolic discounting and event uncertainty. We then
specialized to a binary action model, in which at each point in time the regu-
lator follows BAU or stabilizes the risk. In general, there are multiple MPE
because the optimal decision for the current regulator depends on the shadow
value of the hazard, which in turn depends on the strategies used by succeed-
ing regulators. These equilibria involve either perpetual BAU or perpetual
stabilization. We provided a necessary and su±cient condition under which
there is also an equilibrium in which policymakers follow BAU until the haz-
ard reaches a threshold, and then switch to stabilization. By considering
a limiting problem with constant discounting, we showed that there can be
MPE with excessive stabilization (relative to the social optimum).
We emphasized the situation where the event is \low-risk", i.e. the hazard
rate is much smaller than anything that (most) economists would recognize
as a plausible short run social discount rate. A model of constant discounting
(at a non-negligible rate) has little that is useful to say about such events.
Our numerical example used a hyperbolic discount rate that remains above
4% for a century into the future, and eventually falls to a level below the
steady state hazard.
The scienti¯c evidence is currently inadequate to reliably estimate the
26risk of speci¯c climate-related events. We chose parameters so that the
current risk is low. Under perpetual stabilization the risk remains constant;
under perpetual BAU it increases at a diminishing rate, reaching half way
to its maximal level within a century. Under plausible parameter values,
it is optimal to forgo a substantial fraction of the value-at-risk in order to
stabilize the hazard. In view of the limited empirical basis for the risk
calibration, these numerical results are only suggestive, yet they indicate that
a systematic accounting of catastrophic risk might warrant a more aggressive
climate policy, compared to the prescriptions of most integrated assessment
models.
The numerical experiments illustrate the possibility that there can be
MPE that result in excessive stabilization, relative to the restricted com-
mitment benchmark. However, there always exist utility parameters for
which there is a MPE that results in too little stabilization, relative to this
benchmark. For some combinations of the utility and risk-related parameter
values, all MPE result in too little stabilization e®ort.
The free-rider problem amongst decision-makers in the current generation
presents a serious and well-understood impediment to optimal climate pol-
icy. The present analysis illuminates the problem of coordination amongst
decision-makers in succeeding generations.
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31Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 (i) This claim follows from di®erentiating the
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where y(t;h) is a specialization of y(t), de¯ned in (4), when the hazard
process under BAU evolves according to equation (11). From equations
(14), (16) and (33),









It is easy to verify that 1¡e¡½t
½ is strictly decreasing in ½ for ½ > 0 and equals t
at ½ = 0. Therefore, y(t;h) > ht when h < a and ½ > 0, and the right-hand
side of equation (34) is negative. (iii) This claim is merely a summary of the
derivation in the text above equation (18).
(iv) (Su±ciency) Suppose that ¸(h) is non-decreasing. Then for any
1 ¡ x ¸ ¸(h) it is optimal to stabilize. Since h does not change under
stabilization, it is also optimal to stabilize at any point in the future. For
any 1 ¡ x < ¸(h) it is optimal to follow BAU. Since h increases along
the BAU trajectory, the inequality 1¡x < ¸(h) continues to hold along this
trajectory and BAU remains optimal. (Necessity). Suppose that ¸ is strictly
decreasing over some interval 0 · h1 < h < h2 · a. Choose a value of h
in this interval (the initial condition h(0)), and choose 1 ¡x = ¸(h(0)) ¡²,
where ² is small and positive. At this initial condition and for this value
of 1 ¡ x, it is optimal to follow BAU, causing h to increase. Because ¸
is decreasing in this neighborhood, there is a future time t > 0 at which
1¡x = ¸(h(t)). At this time, it becomes optimal to stabilize, so the initial
decision to pursue BAU in perpetuity is not time consistent.







32Using equation (33) we have




The argument h in y(t;h) is the initial hazard. Di®erentiating (35) with
respect to h, we see that ¸
















































Since ± > °, the right-hand side of inequality (38) is smaller than
µ
¯







(h + ±)(1 ¡ e¡½t)
½
dt: (39)











which is guaranteed to hold if ½ > h + ±. Since h · a and h approaches a
under BAU, the inequality holds at all h 2 [0;a] if ½ > a + ±. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2 We use Proposition 1 and Remark 2 in Karp
(2007). In that paper the state variable is a scalar, but the same results
hold (making obvious changes in notation) when the state is a vector, as in
the present case. Our state variable is z ´ (h;y) and the °ow of utility (prior
to the event) is e¡y(t)U(w(t)). Specializing equation (5) of Karp (2007) to
33our setting, and using the hyperbolic discount factor in equation (1), yields
the generalized DPE




¡y(t)U(w(t)) + Whg + Wyh
¢
; (40)
where W(z) is the value function (with subscripts denoting partial di®eren-
tiation) and




¡(±t+y(t))U (^ Â(z))dt (41)
is implied by equation (4) and Remark 2 of Karp (2007)
Use the \trial solution" W(z) = e¡yV (h) and ^ K (z) = e¡yK(h), so Wy =
¡e¡yV (h) and Wh = e¡yV 0(h). Substituting these expressions into equation
(40), cancelling e¡y and rearranging, yields equation (19). Conclude that
^ Â(z) = Â(h): the equilibrium control depends only on the hazard rate.
Conditional on survival up to time t, the probability of survival until time






= exp(¡y(s) + y(t)). Use this fact and the
trial solution to rewrite equation (41) as


















Setting t = 0 in equation (42) produces equation (20). ¤
Proof of Lemma 1 De¯ne
$(h) ´ ¼(h)
¡1 = 1 ¡ ½(a ¡ h)»
0(h): (43)
Di®erentiating, noting (22), we obtain
$
0(h) = ½»
0(h) ¡ ½(a ¡ h)»





2 > 0: (45)
34Di®erentiating (24), noting (25), gives
¾
0 (h) = ¡½º
0(h) + ½(a ¡ h)º
00 (h) > 0: (46)
To establish ¾00(h) < 0, use equation (25) and di®erentiate twice to obtain
º000(h) < 0: Di®erentiating equation (46) gives
¾
00(h) = ¡2½º
00(h) + ½(a ¡ h)º
000 (h) < 0:
By inspection ¼ (a) = ¾ (a) = 1. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3 We ¯rst establish su±ciency of inequality (26)
using a constructive proof, which also establishes the claims associated with
inequalities (27) and (28). We then show necessity of inequality (26) using
a proof by contradiction.
Su±ciency Suppose that ¾ > ¼ for h 2 (0;a). We show that there
exists a MPE that satis¯es w ´ 1 (perpetual stabilization) if and only if the
initial condition h0 = h satis¯es equation (27). In a MPE with perpetual
stabilization, it is optimal for the current regulator to stabilize given that she
believes that future values of h lie in the stabilization region (so she believes
that all subsequent regulators will stabilize). The belief that future values
of h lie in the stabilization region (a belief we test below) means that for
initial conditions in the interior of the stabilization region the value function





0 (h) given by equation (22).
Using equation (19) (and the belief that future values of h lie in the
stabilization region), it is optimal for the current regulator to stabilize if and
only if





¸ ¼ (h): (49)
35If inequality (49) is satis¯ed with strict inequality (as the Proposition re-
quires) at the current time, then regardless of whether the current regulator
uses stabilization or BAU, the inequality is satis¯ed at neighboring times (the
near future). Thus, the current regulator's beliefs that future regulators will
stabilize are consistent with equilibrium, regardless of the actions taken by
the current regulator. If inequality (49) is not satis¯ed, then clearly perpet-
ual stabilization is not an equilibrium. We consider below the case where
the weak inequality (49) holds with equality.
We turn now to the equilibrium with perpetual BAU. In a MPE with
perpetual BAU, it is optimal for the current regulator to follow BAU given
that she believes all subsequent regulators will follow BAU. This belief im-
plies that the value function is given by V B (h), de¯ned in equation (13).
It is optimal for the current regulator to pursue BAU if and only if U(0) +
½(a ¡ h)U(0)º0 (h) > U (1) or, equivalently, if and only if
U (1)
U(0)
< ¾ (h) ´ 1 + ½(a ¡ h)º
0 (h); (50)
establishing condition (28).
To complete the demonstration that perpetual stabilization is an equi-
librium, it is necessary to con¯rm that if equation (28) is satis¯ed at time t
when the hazard is h, then it is also satis¯ed at all subsequent times, so that
the regulator's beliefs are con¯rmed. The hazard is increasing on the BAU
equilibrium path (and non-decreasing on any feasible path), so it is su±cient
to show that ¾0 (h) > 0. This inequality was established in Lemma 1.
Now we return to the case where inequality (49) is satis¯ed with equality.
We want to show that in this case, stabilization is not an equilibrium action.
Suppose to the contrary that it is optimal to stabilize when inequality (49) is
satis¯ed with equality. From equation (21), the current regulator wants to
use BAU if and only if U (1) < U (0)+ ½(a ¡ h)V 0(h). In order to evaluate
the right side of this inequality, we need to know the value of V 0 (h); this
(shadow) value of course depends on the behavior of future regulators.
36Because ¼0(h) > 0 from Lemma 1, if the current regulator uses BAU, h
increases and the state is driven out of the stabilization region. Therefore,
the current regulator can discard the possibility that (if she were to use BAU)
all future regulators would stabilize. Future actions could lead to only one
of two possible equilibrium trajectories: (i) All future regulators will follow
BAU; or (ii) future regulators will follow BAU until the state h reaches a
threshold, say h0 < ~ h < a, after which all regulators stabilize. There are no
other possibilities, because once the state enters a stabilization region it does
not leave it. This fact is a consequence of our restriction to pure strategy
equilibria. However, alternative (ii) cannot occur, because ~ h lies to the right
of the curve ¼ (h), and therefore is not an element of the stabilization region.
Thus, the only equilibrium belief for the current regulator is that the use of
BAU (and the subsequent increase in h) will cause all future regulators to
use BAU. Consequently, where inequality (49) is satis¯ed with equality, it
must be the case that V 0(h) = V B0(h) = U(0)º0 (h). The assumption that
¾(h) > ¼(h) implies that ¼(h) lies in the region where perpetual BAU is an
equilibrium strategy. Thus, ¼(h) does not lie in the stabilization region, as
asserted by the proposition.
Necessity: We use a proof by contradiction, consisting of two parts, to
establish necessity. The ¯rst part shows that ¾ (h) < ¼ (h) cannot hold, and
the second part shows that it cannot be the case that ¾ (h) = ¼ (h) at any
points in (0;a).
For the ¯rst part, suppose that for some interval ¾ (h) < ¼ (h). Figure 5
helps to simplify the proof. This ¯gure shows a situation where ¾ (h) < ¼ (h)
for small h, but it is clear from the following argument that the region over
which ¾ (h) < ¼ (h) is irrelevant. (An obvious variation of the following
argument can be used regardless of the region over which ¾ < ¼, because both
of these curves are monotonic.) Suppose that the value of
U(1)
U(0) lies between
the vertical intercepts of the curves, as shown in the ¯gure; e.g.
U(1)
U(0) =
d. De¯ne h1 implicitly by ¾ (h1) = d. we want to establish that for any
37initial condition h0 = h < h1 there are no pure stationary MPE. Perpetual
stabilization is not an equilibrium because d < ¼ (h1), and perpetual BAU is
not an equilibrium because d > ¾ (h1). The only remaining possibility is to
follow BAU until the hazard reaches a level ¹ h < h1 and then begin perpetual
stabilization. (Recall that once the state enters the stabilization set it cannot
leave that set.) However, this trajectory cannot be an equilibrium because
the subgame beginning at ¹ h cannot lead to perpetual stabilization (because











Figure 5: Graphs of ¾(h) and ¼(h) that do not satisfy inequality (26).
For the second part, suppose that ¾ (h) ¸ ¼ (h) with equality holding at
one or more points in (0;a) (that is, the graphs are tangent at one or more







, then at h = ^ h (where equation (49) holds
with equality) neither perpetual stabilization not perpetual BAU are MPE.
The only remaining possibility would be to follow BAU for a time and then
switch to stabilization in perpetuity. However, that cannot be an equilibrium
trajectory, because the initial period of BAU drives the h above ^ h, where
U(1)
U(0) < ¼ (h), so the subsequent stabilization period cannot be part of a







Proof of Proposition 4 We use the following de¯nition
h¼(x) ´
(
¼¡1(1 ¡ x) for x 2 [0;1 ¡ ¼(0))
0 for x 2 [1 ¡ ¼(0);1]
(51)
Hazard rates that satisfy h > h¼(x) lie above the curve 1 ¡ ¼ in Figure 1.
(i) The stabilization set is absorbing, because if a (pure strategy) MPE
calls for a regulator to stabilize, the hazard never changes. By Proposition
3, there are no equilibria with perpetual stabilization when h(0) ¸ h¼, and
there is an equilibrium with perpetual BAU. The latter is therefore the
unique equilibrium. Claim (ii) follows immediately from the fact that the
stabilization set is absorbing
(iii) We now consider the case where h(0) < h¼; equivalently, x < 1¡¼ (h).
From Proposition 3 we know that there is an equilibrium with perpetual sta-
bilization for these initial conditions; and we know that there is an equilib-
rium with perpetual BAU if x lies between the curves 1¡¼ and 1¡¾: Since
the stabilization set is absorbing, we do not need to consider the possibility
of equilibria that begin with stabilization and then switch to BAU. Thus,
we need only ¯nd a necessary and su±cient condition under which there is
a \delayed stabilization" equilibrium, i.e. one that begins with BAU and
switches to stabilization when the state reaches a threshold ~ h > h(0). To
conserve notation, throughout the remainder of this proof we use h to denote
an initial condition, and use h(¿), with ¿ ¸ 0, to denote a subsequent value
of the hazard when regulators use a MPE.
De¯ne two sets, A =
n




h j ~ h · h < hb
o
, where
ha < ~ h < hb < h¼. The MPE for initial conditions in set B is to stabilize,
and the MPE for initial conditions in set A is to follow BAU. The existence
of B follows from the fact that it is an equilibrium to stabilize for any initial
conditions in [0;h¼) (in view of Proposition 3). In addition, h remains
39constant when the regulator stabilizes. Therefore, any subset of the interval
[0;h¼) quali¯es as the set B.
The existence of A is not obvious. We cannot rely on the proof of
Proposition 3, since that proof applies to the case where the regulator follows
BAU in perpetuity. Here we are interested in the case where the regulator
switches from BAU to stabilization at a ¯nite time. We obtain the necessary
and su±cient condition for the existence of a set A with positive measure.
Suppose (provisionally) that the set A exists. We de¯ne the value func-
tion for initial conditions in A [ B as V (h;~ h). We include the second
argument in order to emphasize the dependence of the payo® on the switch-
ing value ~ h. For convenience, we repeat the de¯nition of the value function,









¡y(¿)µ(¿)U(Â(h(¿))d¿ with Â(h) =
½
0 for h 2 A










a ¡ (a ¡ h)e¡½s;~ h
´
for h 2 A
h for h 2 B
)
:
Note that for h(¿) 2 A, h(¿) is a function of the initial condition, h.
For h 2 A the regulator chooses BAU (under the candidate program).
Using equation (21), this action is part of an equilibrium if and only if
U (0) ¡ U (1) > ¡½(a ¡ h)Vh(h;~ h): (52)
In order to determine when this inequality holds, we need to evaluate Vh(h;~ h).
For h 2 A the value function can be split into two parts: the payo® that arises
from following BAU until reaching the threshold ~ h, and the subsequent payo®
under stabilization. We state some intermediate results before discussing this
two-part value function.
De¯ne T(h;~ h) as the amount of time it takes to reach the stabilization
threshold (the \time-to-go"), given the current state h 2 A; T is the solution
to





















































The last equality uses the fact that h(T) = ~ h, from the de¯nition of T. Using
equation (53) and (54), we can invert the function T(h;~ h) to write the initial
condition h as a function of the time-to-go T and the threshold ~ h. Using















We now discuss the value function for h 2 A. Splitting the payo® into

















































41Using this expression, we can write the optimality condition (52) as



















It is convenient to treat T as the independent variable, recognizing that the
initial condition h is a function of T (from equation (53)): h = h(T). The
existence of a set A with positive measure requires that inequality (59) holds
for small positive values of T, i.e. for initial conditions h close to but smaller
than ~ h.
The ¯rst order Taylor expansion of the ¯rst term on the right side of
inequality (59) is
(U (0) ¡ U (1)) ¡ (U (0) ¡ U (1))
³
~ h + r(0)
´
T + o(T): (60)
This expansion uses equations (2) and (57) and the fact that µ(0) = 1. Using
the fact that 1 ¡ e¡½T = 0 at T = 0, the ¯rst order Taylor expansion of the
second term on the right side of inequality (59) is
½
³




0 e¡y(¿)µ(¿)U(1)dt + o(T) =
½
³




0 e¡~ h¿µ(¿)U(1)dt + o(T) =
½
³




(~ h+°)(~ h+±) U(1) + o(T):
(61)
Substituting expressions (60) and (61) into inequality (59), dividing by T
and letting T ! 0 (from above) produces the inequality
(U (0) ¡ U (1))
³




a ¡ ~ h
´ (1 ¡ ¯)° + ¯± + ~ h
³
~ h + °
´³
~ h + ±
´ U(1): (62)
Using x ´ 1¡
U(1)
U(0) and r(0) = ¯°+±(1¡¯) (from equation (2)), and replacing
~ h with h, inequality (62) can be expressed as
x
1 ¡ x










x > £(h); (64)









(h + °)2 +
1 ¡ ¯
(h + ±)2;
we express ¼(h), de¯ned in (23), as
¼(h) =
1







Expanding 1 ¡ ¼(h) ¡ £(h) as a polynomial in ¯ and collecting terms
gives (after some algebraic manipulations) equation (31). ¤
Proof of Proposition 5 We ¯rst point out that existence of a solution
to the optimal control problem requires that ¾0 (h) ¸ ¼0 (h) over h 2 [0;a].
We then show that there is no solution to the regulator's optimization prob-
lem that involves delayed stabilization. We then show that stabilization is
optimal if and only if x · 1 ¡ ¾0 (h).
If ¾0 (h) ¸ ¼0 (h) over h 2 [0;a] were not satis¯ed, then (using the argu-
ment in the proof of Proposition 3) there would be some initial h and values
0 <
U(1)
U(0) < 1 for which there is no Markov perfect solution. However, the
objective function under constant discounting is bounded and a solution to
the optimal control problem exists. Therefore, ¾0(h) ¸ ¼0(h).
Constant discounting occurs when ¯ = 0 or ¯ = 1 or ° = ±. It is clear
from equation (31) that condition (30) is not satis¯ed in any of these cases,
implying, in view of Proposition 4 Part (iii), that there can be no equilibrium
with delayed stabilization.
We now turn to the main part of the proof. For h close to but smaller
than a, ¾0 (h) > ¼0 (h). (We established the weak inequality above; here
we need the strict inequality.) This claim uses a Taylor expansion. The
43Taylor expansion uses the facts that ¾0 (a) = ¼0 (a) = 1 and the derivatives












Thus, for some parameter values and initial conditions, ¼0 (h) <
U(1)
U(0) < ¾0 (h)
holds. For parameters that satisfy this inequality, in view of Proposition 3,
the DPE (32) admits two solutions. With constant discounting, however, the
solution to the optimization problem is unique. The possibility that there
are multiple solutions to the necessary condition (the DPE), even though
there is a unique optimal policy, also occurs in other control problems (e.g.,
Skiba 1978). We use the same line of reasoning as in the \Skiba problem"
to identify the optimal policy.
Consider the situation where ¼0(h) <
U(1)
U(0) < ¾0(h). Denote V S (h) and
V B (h) as the value functions that satisfy the DPE (32) under stabilization
and BAU, respectively, and let V (h) = max
©
V S (h);V B (h)
ª
denote payo®
under the optimal decision. The arguments used in the proof of Proposition
3 imply that for
U(1)
U(0) < ¾0(h), V B (h) satis¯es
V B (h) = 1
±+h max
©














U(0) > ¼0(h), V S (h) satis¯es
V S (h) = 1
±+h max
©




±+hU (1) ¸ 1
±+h
¡





From (65) and (66) we see that V B(h) > V S(h) when ¼0 (h) <
U(1)
U(0) < ¾0 (h).
Therefore, when ¼0 (h) <
U(1)
U(0) < ¾0 (h) the (unique) optimal policy is BAU.
Again using the arguments in Proposition 3, V S (h) is the only solution
to the DPE when
U(1)
U(0) > ¾0 (h); when this inequality is satis¯ed, the optimal
solution is to stabilize. V B (h) is the only solution when
U(1)
U(0) < ¼0 (h); when
44this inequality is satis¯ed, BAU is the optimal solution. By convention, we
break the tie, which occurs when
U(1)
U(0) = ¾0 (h), by choosing stabilization. ¤
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